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Abstract
This research is a critical study for Jordanian parliamentary evolution and its impact
on political reform in Jordan. We hypothesize a significant correlation between
parliamentary development and democratization in Jordan. The study found that the
Parliamentary institution, which represents the core of democracy in Jordan, is weak and
lacking the ability to perform its main political duties. Researchers concluded that
democracy in Jordan is in a status of stagnation. Since its formation in 1929 until 2019,
parliament’s political power within the Jordanian political system remains substantially
ineffective. The Executive Branch of government possess far more political power than
the Legislative Branch of government. This fact that our research found negatively
affects the credibility of the whole Jordanian political reform rhetoric. We use the
descriptive analytical historic approach and content analysis of the legal provisions that
govern the parliamentary development in Jordan.
KeyWords: Parliamentary Evolution, Political Reform, Legal and Constitutional
Reform.

Introduction
Despite the impressiveness of Jordan’s parliament when compared to other
Middle Eastern states, its political power is continuously unstable and
fluctuating. Therefore, as far as democratization is concerned, Jordan is far from
perfect. Since 1929, Jordan’s eighteen different legislative bodies (between19291947 there was 5 legislative bodies) have witnessed setbacks due to different
electoral laws as well as continued attempts by the government to limit its
powers, and the varying influence of political parties. The laws and legislative
processes currently in place render the popularly-elected parliament ineffective
at best and a mere pawn of the actual power centers at worst. Firstly, the specific
mechanics of the legislative process puts serious decision-making power in the
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hands of the executive branch. Secondly, elections are structured in such a way
that favors candidates that are unlikely to belong to organized opposition groups
or political parties, mostly due to the types of electoral systems utilized. Thirdly,
the parliament is lacking in terms of organizational and technological
capabilities; e.g. primitive electronic voting systems and undeveloped sessions’
proceedings.
The combination of these elements creates a cycle of political apathy that
will not end easily. But a flawed system of representative government is
infinitely better than none. Parliament continues to be a legitimate outlet for
popular opinion and criticism of governmental policies. The fact that a sovereign
electoral body is already present in Jordan means that there is high potential
from which to improve. This research critically examines the development of
parliamentary politics in Jordan as well as the greatest challenges it faces, in an
effort to cast light on the true nature of the Jordanian parliamentary politics
hence its democratic status. It describes several aspects of Jordan’s
parliamentary evolution, the legal framework guiding the legislation process,
and the major challenges parliament faces. This in turn should give significant
insight on the overall status of democracy in Jordan.
Research Questions
The main research agenda is to explore the status of parliamentary
development in Jordan and democracy. This research aims to address the
following questions:
1. What is the historic evolution of Jordan's parliamentary politics?
2. What are the most important changes in the legal and constitutional articles
that affect the legislative structure and process in Jordan?
3. What are the major challenges that face the Parliamentary institution in
Jordan and the likelihood of its development?
4. What is the impact of Jordan's Parliamentary development on Jordan's
democratization process?
Research Goals and Hypotheses
This research aims to critically explore the evolution of Jordan's
Parliamentary politics and its relationship with the status of democratization in
Jordan.
General Hypothesis:
We hypothesize that there is a significant correlation between parliamentary
development and democratization in Jordan.
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Sub-Hypothesis1: The underlining assumption is that Jordan's parliamentary
development was instrumental in maintaining a relatively better democratic
standing.
Sub-Hypothesis2: The research further proceeds under the assumption that while
Parliamentary development in Jordan is the major reason behind its
"democracy in transition" status, the lack of major changes and consecutive
progress has hindered Jordan's elevation to an absolute democracy status.
Research Approach
The scientific method of inquiry that best suits this research is the
descriptive analytical historic approach and a content analysis of the legal
provisions that govern parliamentary development in Jordan. This is in addition
to the Institutional Analysis Approach of scientific inquiry. These qualitative
approaches will utilize historic and legal findings, as well as previous research.
This approach also provides the necessary thorough analysis and description of
the phenomena under examination. It values accuracy as a scientific goal, and
overlooks generalizability that tends to be the pursued scientific target in the
case of quantitative empirical research. The study will start by exploring the
historic evolution of Jordanian Parliament analyzing the contemporary legal
framework for the legislative branch in Jordan, and the greatest challenges
facing parliament. The study will end with a conclusion and summary of
findings.
Importance of the Study
The study herein is of a significant importance because Jordan has been a
democracy in transition for a long time with not enough research on the role of
Legislative on this stagnation. The study, therefore, fills a scientific gap.
Practically on the other hand, understanding the role of Parliament can indeed be
a major enhancement toward advancing democracy in Jordan.
Historic Overview:
The Origins of Representative Government in Jordan
The history of modern Jordan began on April 11, 1921, when Emir
Abdullah established the central government of Transjordan in the approximate
borders of modern day Jordan (Embassy of Jordan—Washington, 2007).
Although Transjordan was under a British mandate, the Emir diligently set about
obtaining independence, and on May 1923 his efforts were rewarded with the
signing of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty, which gave Transjordan a semiautonomous status, recognized Emir Abdullah as the Head of State, and allowed
him to establish national armed forces.
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Transjordan's constitution was drafted in April 1928 when Emir Abdullah
and Great Britain agreed on the establishment of the "Organic Law," which
served as the nation's constitution until it gained independence from Great
Britain in 1946. The law called for the creation of the Legislative Council, an
electoral body which replaced the former Executive Council (The Office of King
Hussein I of Jordan, 2007). Elections for the first Legislative Council were held
in 1929. The body consisted of sixteen members, fourteen of whom were
indirectly elected by a directly elected body of "secondary electors," while the
remaining two were appointed by the Emir from the North and South Bedouins
after he forms two committees to select these two deputies (Abu Nowar, 1989,
304). The Legislative Council's powers were mainly advisory, but it is
worthwhile to note that Jordan has experience with electoral politics dating back
to 1929 (Salibi, 2006,115).
Unification of the East and West Bank (1950-1988)
Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the West Bank was incorporated into
the Kingdom in 1950, and roughly 500,000 Palestinians living west of the
Jordan River became Jordanians, drastically changing the state's domestic
political situation and voting demographic. Parliamentary elections were held in
1950, and the West Bank was given equal representation. The number of seats in
Parliament was increased from twenty to forty, with half allotted to the newly
acquired West Bank. The new Parliament was made up largely of supporters of
the State, but members of the Arab nationalist Ba'ath party and other critics of
Jordan's government also gained some seats. It is of crucial importance to note
that political parties were not only permitted, but were also very active and
relatively strong at this time (Abu-Odeh,1999,49). Furthermore, the Parliament
during the 1950s was comparatively more willing to oppose the executive
branch than it has been during most other eras of Jordanian politics. After the
new Parliament was formed and on April 24, 1950, it officially declared the
unification of the East and West Banks, expanding Jordan's territory to include
the West Bank and granting full citizenship to all Palestinians "who wished to
claim it." From that point on, Palestinians and the Jordanian government have
been inextricably linked.
The year 1952 saw the creation of a new, more liberal, constitution, and
remedied some of the major "flaws" in the previous version. The major additions
to this constitution included the creation of increased separation between the
different branches of government, and giving Parliament the powers to propose
laws and to force the cabinet's resignation through a vote of no-confidence. The
latter power is of crucial importance because, as discussed below, the ability to
hold the government accountable is perhaps the most important power Jordan's
Parliament possesses. Under the previous constitution, Parliament's power was
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essentially limited to playing a part in the passing of legislation; this added
power drastically increased the importance of the Jordan's elected Parliament.
The Chaos of the 1950s
Important developments occurred during the 1950s. Firstly, Arab nationalist
parties were gaining power in Jordanian society and in the Parliament. In a
victory for leftists, the 1956 elections resulted in Ba'athists and representatives
of the National Socialist Party, an Arab nationalist group sympathetic to
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, winning about half the seats in
Parliament (17 seats), the balance being controlled by state-loyalist
conservatives (US Library of Congress 2007). The steadily growing support for
Arab nationalism was dangerous to the moderate regime in Jordan. The second
development came in 1957, when an Arab nationalist coup attempt was foiled.
In response to the increasingly frightening threat of Arab nationalism, adherence
to the constitution was halted that year, martial law was declared, political
parties were band for thirty years, and the government was accountable only to
the King. Parliament remained in session, but it was stripped of real political
power reverting back to its original state. The final major event came in
February of 1958, when Jordan merged with Iraq under the title of the Arab
Federation. The Arab Federation experiment came to a grinding halt when
Hashemite rule was overthrown in Iraq in a bloody coup led by Ba'athists. The
revolution in Iraq had major consequences for the entire region, especially in
Jordan. Iraq, which had been one of the largest obstacles to supporters of panArabism, was no longer an issue, and it was generally believed that Jordan
would soon follow. The fall of Iraq to revolutionary nationalists was
tremendously threatening to the state of Jordan (Salibi, 2006, 201-203). The
accumulation of these issues created very negative consequences for Jordan's
parliament. In addition to the declaration of martial law (Marshal Administrative
Regulations of 1957 and 1967 though its referred to as Marshal Law), which was
dismantled in 1991, the government responded to the nationalist threat by
prohibiting political parties entirely in 1957, which would remain the case for
over thirty years (US Library of Congress, 2008). A period of deliberalization
had indisputably begun in Jordan.
The 1967 War and the Halt of Electoral Politics
Parliamentary life in Jordan experienced another drastic changed after Israel
occupied the West Bank following the disastrous Six Day War in 1967. The
occupation meant that Jordan no longer had real control of the West Bank, but it
retained administrative duties in the area. The fact that half of Jordan's
Parliamentary seats were allotted to people living in occupied territory, which
Jordan maintained was within its borders, created additional problems for
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electoral politics in Jordan. Consequentially, elections held in April 1967, two
months prior to the war with Israel, would be the last time Jordanians voted for a
new parliament for over two decades (The Office of King Hussein of Jordan,
2007; The New York Times, 20 December 1989). However, the Parliament was
not disbanded, but remained in session until 1974. The same Parliament was
recalled for a brief period in 1976 and then twice more in 1984 and 1986, but in
the last two re-callings Parliament was considered the 10th House of Deputies
and was extended 2 years until 1988. Both 1984 and 1986 also saw by-elections
(complementary elections), in which East Bank citizens voted for representatives
to fill vacant seats, but the Parliament was made up primarily by MPs elected in
1967 (Bani slamah, Aledwan, 2016).
It is important to stress that the issue of parliamentary elections (or the lackthere-of) during this era was incredibly complicated. In addition to all the major
threats facing the Hashemite government that had become so frightening during
the 1950s, Jordan's situation was made more problematic by the fact that it no
longer had control over land that made up half of the country's polity.
Disbanding the 1967 Parliament entirely and holding new elections would mean
the exclusion of West Bankers, which would in turn mean Jordan's acceptance of
the Israeli occupation. Twenty two years with no national elections followed
these events while the 9th and 10th House of Deputies remained in session.
The 1980s and the Resumption of Parliamentary Life
During the 1980s, the circumstances for the Jordanian parliament changed
again. Jordan's willingness to continue dealing with problems regarding the
West Bank was on the decline, and on July 28, 1988 King Hussein formally
dissolved the 1967 Parliament, meaning that West Bank representation in
Jordanian politics was over. Three days later he gave a speech formally
declaring administrative and legal separation with the West Bank (Salibi, 2006,
268). These two decisions were instrumental in severing the administrative ties
between Jordan and the West Bank allowing electoral politics under the
constitution to be possible once again.
Other developments during the 1980s also contributed to the resumption of
parliament life. The Kingdom was facing serious and mounting debt, caused by
poor economic management and corruption, and the Jordanian people were
becoming increasingly discontent with government failures, culminating finally
into major riots in 1989 (Robbins, 1990, 55-57). Riots started in Ma’an in the
south spreading into different governorates, demanded better economic policies
and standards of living, fighting corruption, and more representation. This time,
the Jordanian government responded to adversity by liberalizing. Because the
West Bank issue was no longer relevant, and because the government was facing
660
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mounting internal pressure, allowing citizens to vote and form a new parliament
was both possible and practical. After the necessary changes were made in
Jordan’s electoral laws and districts to accommodate a state that no longer
included the West Bank, parliamentary elections were held in Jordan for the first
time since 1967.
Democracy Comeback:
Jordan's Eleventh Parliament
The results of the 1989 election were drastically different than had been
predicted. Islamists, represented primarily by the Muslim Brotherhood, had been
expected to win less than ten seats; however, they wound up with thirty-four
(twenty of which were won by Muslim Brotherhood candidates, the other
fourteen were taken by MB supported independents). Meanwhile, leftists, who
were not expected to get more than one seat in the parliament, ended up with ten.
Oppositional forces thus controlled forty-four seats, making up more than half of
the eighty-member parliament, which most had assumed would be dominated by
traditionalists in support of the state (Robbins, 1990, 57).
The 1989 Parliament was an energetic, active, and relevant political force.
Members debated various controversial topics, such as "corruption, economic
reform, and civil liberties," and parliamentary discourse were openly discussed
in the press. Some important steps towards further liberalization were taken
during the existence of this Parliament, including the legalization of political
parties in 1992, the complete lifting of the administrative regulations of martial
law in 1991, and the passing of a relatively liberal press law in 1993.
The Reversal of the Liberalization Process
This brief golden age in Jordanian democratization came to a halt in 1993,
when it became clear that the Jordanian government did not intend to continue
the liberalization process at the rapid speed it had set four years previously. The
government's goals were markedly different than those of the Islamists,
especially regarding Jordan's relationship with the West, most importantly in
relation to peace negotiations with Israel, which were completed in 1994.
Overwhelming Islamist opposition in parliament was therefore viewed as a
major threat to Jordan's interests. In 1993, the government began taking steps to
reduce the power of opposition forces in Parliament by passing the one-man,
one-vote law, which forced voters to select only one candidate in multicandidate
districts, decreasing the likelihood of oppositional forces gaining seats in
Parliament (Choucair, 2006). Opposition forces nearly boycotted the 1993
elections in protest of the new law, but reluctantly participated. The effect of the
new electoral laws on the Islamic Action Front IAF (the political party created
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by the Muslim Brotherhood following the lift of the political parties ban) was
clear: the party won only 16 seats in the 1993 parliament, whereas in 1989 it
won 24, and independent Islamists managed to win only two, compared to the 10
they gained 1989. Although leftists did not experience a dramatic drop in
representation, the huge decrease in the number of seats held by Islamists made
the elections a clear victory for traditionalist, pro-state forces.
During the mid-1990s, the relationship between the cabinet and the
Parliament deteriorated, and hostilities between the government and the people
intensified as well (Choucair, 2006). In 1997, the government reacted to
increasing popular and Parliamentary opposition by continuing its
deliberalization process with the passage of a new press and publications law,
which increased restrictions on both who was permitted to publish newspapers
and what they were allowed to publish. Partly in response to the new laws, and
partly due to a general belief that involvement in Parliament was fruitless, the
IAF, along with most other opposition parties, boycotted the 1997 elections.
Parliament was dismissed in June 2001. Elections were then postponed
twice (2001-2003) due to the fear that regional tension during that era would
result in a radicalization of Jordanian society and a strong Islamist representation
in a popularly elected Parliament (Carnegie Papers, 2006).
When elections were held again in 2003, the IAF, after some consideration,
decided it was better to have Parliamentary representation than to boycott
elections, and the party participated in elections for the first time since 1993.
Although the elections resulted in Islamists once again making up the biggest
opposition party in Parliament, taking 17 out of 110 seats, their strength was
drastically less than it had been in the early nineties, as the 2003-2007
parliament was dominated by pro-state forces (Carnegie Papers, 2006). Relative
to where it had been at the beginning of the liberalization process, Parliament
had become an impotent political body.
Constitutional and Legal Framework for Legislation in Jordan
As is the case in most semi-democratic political systems containing
representative legislatures, the Jordanian legal structure is intentionally designed
to limit the power of the Parliament. The existence of legal barriers on
Parliamentary influence is not unique to Jordan. The framework of legislative
and electoral processes poses major barriers to the Parliament's ability to be an
efficient, influential, and representative institution in the governing process.
The appropriate starting point for a discussion of Jordan's legal framework
is, of course, the state' constitution and its amendments. The current constitution
was created in 1952, during an era when Jordan's political parties were strong.
662
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Although the 1952 constitution granted more power to the Parliament than the
previous constitution, a brief examination of its actual provisions demonstrates
the reality that most political power was in the hands of the executive, and that
Parliament's power was incredibly limited.
Jordan's governments, as the country's executive, are constitutionally
granted extensive political power. Governments are the sole representative of
Jordan and possess all powers related to foreign affairs (UNDP POGAR, 2007).
Furthermore, although power is separated between the legislative and executive
branches, the executive branch plays a major role in legislation. The entire
Upper House of the legislature, as well as Jordan's Higher Judicial Council are
picked by the Executive Branch of government. The executive branch may also,
in times of emergency, dismiss the legislature, postpone elections, and declare
martial law. Finally, the executive branch of government has veto power over
the passing of all potential laws unless ruled out by at least 2/3 majority of the
both the Upper and Lower House of Parliament.
Jordan's legislative branch is a bicameral system made up of an Upper and
Lower houses. The Chamber of Deputies or the Lower House of Parliament
(Parliament), which is to be elected by direct, free, and fair elections every four
years, shares legislative power with the appointed Senate. One of the main
responsibilities of the Jordanian legislature is, of course, the passing of laws. The
actual legislation process is somewhat complicated, as a bill must go through
various phases before becoming law. First, draft laws must be introduced by the
Government and then submitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
(Jordanian House of Representatives, 2006; The Office of King Hussein I of
Jordan, 2007). Even if ten or more deputies adopt a draft legislation, it must be
sent to the Government that has the constitutional right to send it to the Speaker.
The Parliament then either approves, rejects, or decides to amend the draft law in
which case the draft is passed to the appropriate committee within the House for
consideration. The specialized committee's report regarding the draft law is then
submitted to the rest of the House, which then evaluates the bill and may either
approve, amend, or reject it. If approved, bills are then passed on to the Senate,
where they go through a similar process. If the bill is rejected or amended by the
Senate and these actions are not accepted by the House of Deputies, a joint
session is held with members of both houses in attendance, under the
chairmanship of the Senate Speaker, during which issues in dispute are
discussed through 2/3 majority vote. Once a bill is passed through both the
Lower and Upper House, it is sent to the king who can ratify it, reject it outright,
or resubmit it to the House with a statement explaining the reasons it was not
ratified. A bill officially becomes a law after receiving the king's ratification and
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is published in the Official Gazette, or six months after it has reached the king
but has been neither ratified nor vetoed.
In addition to this role in the legislative process, at least 10 members of
either houses can submit to the Government a proposal for the drafting of
desired law, after which the Government will compose an official draft law if it
wishes to. Secondly, the Parliament has the exclusive responsibility of approving
or rejecting the appointed cabinet, including the Prime Minister, through the
Vote of Confidence procedure. Parliament can at any time pass a vote of no
confidence dismissing the Cabinet of Ministers or any specific Minister.
(Jordanian House of Representatives, 2006; The Office of King Hussein I of
Jordan, 2007) This ability to hold the government accountable is one of the most
important powers Parliament has. Finally, the legislature possesses the power to
override an executive veto over a passed law with a two-thirds majority in both
houses. However, the actual application of this power over any major law is
made unlikely by the fact that the Senate is chosen by the executive and will not
vote against it.
Clearly, the Jordanian Parliament's powers in terms of the role it plays in
legislation and the overall political system are quite limited. Admittedly, bills
must be passed through the Lower House in order to become a law. However,
laws are drafted by the cabinet and must be approved by the executive as well as
the non-elected Senate. Parliament's true legislative role is therefore more of a
check on the Government's ability to pass laws than as an autonomous institution
in an independent legislative branch. Still, the Parliament does have two
important functions: Its role in legislation can at least serve as a forum for
popular opposition to government policies, and, its ability to approve and reject
potential cabinets, as well as its power to dismiss ministers through a vote of no
confidence, allows the Chamber of Deputies to challenge the Cabinet.
Political Reform through Constitutional Reform
The King issued seven Discussion Papers between 2012 and 2017 most of
which were devoted to political reform. To further advance political reform
during this period, two reform committees were established: Constitutional
Amendments Committee and Dialogue Committee. Following constitutional
reform, Elections Law, Political Parties Law, Municipality Law, and
Decentralization Law were issued. These laws were also aiming at developing
democracy life in Jordan. The declared aim behind all these steps is to reach the
political status and set the stage for parliamentary governments.
The Constitution was amended to grant more powers to Parliament, and
somewhat improve the overall balance between the Legislative and Executive
branches. The most significant amendments happened in light of the Arab
664
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Spring when almost two third of the constitution articles were amended. Two
committees were formed in 2011: the National Dialogue Committee and the
Constitution Review Committee. The first was tasked to put suggestions on how
to develop political life including the needed changes of the Constitution, while
the second committee mandate was to focus on constitutional reform. Parliament
status was the main beneficiary of constitutional reform that granted this
institution the weight, independence, and sovereignty it deserves. Amendments
gave some more balance between the Executive and Legislative branches of
government, improved and developed the political, parliamentary, and party life,
and solidified the judiciary as an independent balancer through the establishment
of the Constitutional Court. All previous additions undermining the power of the
Parliament that were added to the constitution since 1952 were demolished. 42
constitutional amendments were enacted out of the total of 131 articles of the
constitution or 32.1%. 13 amendments out of the 42 were related to Parliament,
signaling that developing Parliament status and role was a main target of
constitutional reform. Three main constitutional reforms occurred in Jordan in
2011, 2014, and 2016.
2011 Amendments (Official Gazette 2001):
-Article 53 was amended forbidding the government from using the Speech from
the Throne as its ministerial statement submitted to Parliament to gain vote
of confidence based on it. Previously, governments could simply use the
King’s annual Speech from the Throne as its own speech, program, and
statement.
-Article 55 was amended limiting Parliamentary power to just approving the
trials of ministers and not conducting any trials as was the case before.
Ministers are now tried before the Regular Court system in the capital
Amman.
-Article 58 established a long waited Constitutional Court, which was tasked to
look into the constitutionality of laws and the interpretation of the
Constitution.
-Article 67 established the Independent Election Commission, which was tasked
to supervise and conduct Parliamentary elections. Previously this was the
job of the government specifically the Ministry of Interior. The
establishment of this commission gave significant improvement to the
transparency of national elections. This is a major establishment only
similar to establishing the Constitutional Court.
-Article 69 dictates the election of the Speaker of the House must be for two
years instead of one, saving the House’s time and giving speakership more
stability and status.
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-Article 71 was amended to grant the Court of Appeal the right to look into
election litigations which was previously the job of deputies. This gave
more transparency to election results.
-Article 73 was amended by deleting Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6. These paragraphs
gave the executive branch the power to dissolve parliament and postpone
elections indefinitely. These paragraphs were used to postpone elections
from 1967 till 1989, and freeze parliamentary life from 1974 till 1984 due to
conditions related to war with Israel and the occupation of the West Bank.
Elections must be held within four months if Parliament was dissolved or
ended its final session. If elections were not held, then the dissolved
parliament must be called to reassess.
-Article 74 was amended by adding a paragraph that requires the government
that dissolves Parliament to resign within one week after that. The Prime
Minister of the resigned government cannot form a new government
meaning a government that dissolves Parliament is essentially dissolving
itself as well. Also, Ministers who would like to run for elections must
resign before sixty days of election date not fifteen days as was the case
before.
-Article 78 paragraph 3 was amended extending sessions to six months instead
of 4.
-Article 84 was amended to make only a simple majority needed for the quorum
of Parliament sessions and not two-third majority as was the case.
-Article 94 forbade the government from issuing any temporary laws unless
Parliament was dissolved, and strictly in cases of war, national emergencies,
and un-postponed spending. In any case, temporary laws must be reviewed
and approved by Parliament within the coming two Parliamentary sessions.
-Article 119 dictated that the Audit Bureau must present its annual report to the
Lower and Upper Houses of Parliament when before it was constitutionally
only presented to the Lower house, and informally given to the
Government.
2014 Amendments (Official Gazette 2014):
Article 127 of the Constitution was amended to give the King the sole
authority to appoint the Army Chief of Staff and the Director of the General
Intelligence Department. Before this amendment, the Prime Minister must have
recommended the names of the leaders of these two institutions before the King
could appoint them. This comes in light of the King’s Discussion Papers in
which he outlined his vision for the need and required path for parliamentary
governments. These two institutions along with Constitutional Court and Higher
Judicial Council are very important for the stability of the Parliamentary
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government and must be independent from any party politics that normally
accompanies parliamentary governments. The intention was to keep these
institutions apolitical and away from partisan politics; something that Jordan’s
political system is unique in doing. This amendment was criticized for the
possibility of creating reduced accountability of these institutions given their
direct link to the King alone. It was also criticized for undermining the
Constitution and the role of the King in the system. According to the
Constitution, the King must rule through his ministers. Therefore, practicing his
constitutional duties independently without any role for the ministers
undermines a fundamental component of the Constitution. Finally, the
government may not be held accountable by Parliament for the behavior and
decisions of the Military and Intelligence Department, since they are not legally
and constitutionally responsible for them. This might be a serious breach of the
principle of accountability in parliamentary systems (Hamuri, 2015, 160).
A report issued by an official think tank (Jordan Social and Economic
Council) in 2013 best describes the above. Jordan Social and Economic Council
in that report asserted that governments do not have genuine authority which
was taken by Royal Court and security agencies during this period. Ministers
who are supposed to recommend decisions to be ratified by the King became
subject to the pressures of other rival institutions, hence the balance between
institutions was lost prior to this period and somewhat improved after 2011
amendments (Jordan Social and Economic Council, 2013, 104-106).
2016 Amendments (Official Gazette 2016)
Article 40 was amended to give the sole authority to the King without the
signature of his ministers to appoint the Regent, Crown Prince, Chief and
Members of Constitutional Court, Chief of Higher Judicial Council, Speaker and
members of the Upper House of Parliament, Chief of Staff of the Military,
Director of the General Intelligence Department, and Director of Gendarmerie.
The Lower House of Parliament passed these amendments with 120 for, five
against, and twenty five absent. The 2011 amendments were ratified within 39
days, the 2014 within 16 days, and the 2016 amendments within 18 days. By all
measures, this is an expedited amount of time to ratify such important and
landscape constitutional changes.
The above three waves of amendments clearly show that while the 2011
amendments were a direct push for democracy that to a certain degree created
the needed balance of power between branches of governments and solidified
the role of Parliament in the political dynamics, the same could not be said about
the 2014 and 2016 amendments which were viewed as a step in the opposite
direction. These amendments did not follow suit in the path to actualizing
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parliamentary governments in Jordan - the symbol of democratization and core
message authorities keep emphasizing. In short, we can say that these
constitutional liberalization measures were cosmetic rather than substantial or
operational; the same power distribution and sharing equation continued
(Shadooh, 2017, 95).
Election Laws and Democracy:
Election Laws and Parliament
Election laws plays a vital role in the development and performance of the
elected House of Deputies. Election laws are controversial by definition, yet in
Jordan’s case it has also been used to pre-determine election results of
Parliament hugely affecting the authenticity of political life. Jordan has had five
election laws since the year 1986, these are:
-Election Law 22 for the year 1986 based on which the 1989 elections were held.
32 opposition party members were elected from the 80 seats parliament. The
Law, which was said to be the best for opposition representation, gave a
number of votes to voters similar to the number of seats in their districts.
This Law is considered the most effective in positively impacting the
development of Parliament and political parties. It helped voters move
beyond their tribal loyalties since the Law gave voters an equal number of
votes to the number of seats held for their districts (Reynolds, Reilly, Ellis,
2005, 55).
- Amended Election Law 15 (the Amended same previous law) for the year 1993
is known as the one-man one-vote law. Elections in 1993 and 1997 were
held based on this law. The law gave one vote to voters in a multi-member
districts essentially tribalizing elections and significantly reducing the
number of opposition in parliament. This law is considered by many to be
the most significant detriment to parliamentary and democratic development
in Jordan. The main articles of this Law continued until 2016 constantly
casting negative impact on the development of Parliament (Aladwan, 2004,
63).
-Election Law 34 for the year 2001 preserved the one-man one-vote system. The
Law reduced election age from 19 to 18, and increased the number of
parliament seats from 80 to 110. But most importantly, a first time quota for
women was adopted giving Jordanian women a guaranteed 6 seats in the
House of Deputies.
-Election Law 9 for the year 2010 which also preserved the controversial oneman one-vote article, but this time in multi member “virtual” districts.
Voters were electing without knowing the geographic boundaries of their
districts. The number of deputies was raised in this law to 120.
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-Election Law 25 for the year 2012 increased the number of seats to 150. This
law devoted 27 seats in Parliament to be elected at a national level with
proportional representation and not within any specific districts. The Law
was said to be a combination of the one-man one-vote system and
proportional representation system. The aim was to help political parties run
on national agenda bases and increase their presence in Parliament.
All the changes in election laws in the aftermath of 1989 elections did not
impact the structure or behavior of Parliament. The one-man one-vote created an
environment of political indifferences among Jordanian citizens and political
parties forcing several of them -mainly the biggest Islamic opposition- to boycott
elections. Elections became tribal and not based on programs or policies.
Election Laws hindered the most important institution for democracy
development in Jordan to develop and assume political reform and
democratization.
Election Law 6 for the year 2016
This Law was considered to a high extent a credible departure from the
disastrous one-man one-vote article that significantly damaged political and
parliamentary development, and hurt social unity. It’s an open list proportional
representation election system in which voters vote in as many as the number of
seats in their districts from one list. The percentage of votes received by that list
gives it the same percentage in Parliament.
This law was a significant electoral improvement since 1993. It includes
several advantages most notably the first time deployment of proportional
representation regime even if it is in an open list system. Theoretically speaking,
this should increase party representation in Parliament. Moreover, lists can run
across governorates. Another major big advantage of the law is the new
districting structure and gerrymandering. Except for the three big governorates,
the remaining nine became single one election districts which pushed voters and
candidates to think in a wider more national mind-frame abandoning their tribal
or small geographic political limits. Districts were reduced from 45 to 23 with
Amman having 5 districts, Irbid 4, and Zarqa 2. The remaining including the
three Bedouin districts and one stand-alone district. In 2013, elections of the 17th
House of Deputies, which came after the major constitutional amendments and
the creation of the Independent Election Commission, held a participation
percentage of (39%) with outcomes that did not reflect significant impact on
elections and parliament (Barari, 2013, 7). The new election law created a new
very different dynamic that shacked election stagnations caused by the one-man
one-vote system. The law however was criticized because it did not significantly
help political parties, and created internal competition among lists candidates
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since it was an open not closed proportional system. Proportional representation
systems function well in an election environment where political parties are
strong, mature, and highly competitive, which is not the case in Jordan. Below is
a table of election laws development in Jordan since 1986:
Table 1: The Development of Elections Laws: 1986-2016
Parliament Type of Election System
Election Law
11th
1989- Multi vote list system
Election Law of
1993
(Block Vote)
1986
th
12
1993- One Man One Vote system
Amended election
1997
(Single Non-Transferable Vote)
Law of 1993
16th
2010- One Man One Vote system with virtual Election Law of
2012
districting.
2010
(Single Non-Transferable Vote)
17th
2013- Parallel Mixed System; Election at district Election Law of
2016
level (123 seats) and at national level (27) 2012
(National
Open
List
Proportional
Representation -27 seats / Single NonTransferable Vote- 123 seats).
th
18
2016- Voters vote for the list and candidates inside Election Law of
2020
that list. (Governorate Level Open List 2016
Proportional Representation)
Source: The Table was prepared by researchers based on elections laws in Jordan (19862016)

Uneven Representation within Parliament
The problem of unequal representation was significantly tackled in the 2016
election law but continues to be an issue. Prior to the 1993 law, "voters were
entitled to as many votes as the number of parliamentary seats allocated for their
district (The Office of King Hussein I of Jordan 2007). Most likely in response
to the surprising success of Islamists in the 1989 elections, the government
created a new electoral law, which limited all voters to only one vote.
Commonly referred to as the "one-man, one-vote" law. Even with the 2016 law,
Jordanian voters displayed a tendency to vote first and foremost along local,
service-oriented lines, meaning that a Jordanian voter is more likely to cast a
vote for a candidate that he/she believes will be likely to assist them personally,
than for a candidate running on an ideological or a political platform.
Frequently, these votes are cast along family lines or tribal affiliation. In fact,
these locally-elected deputies are more local elites than they are politicians
(Aledwan, Bani Salameh, Shdouh, 2018, 258) as they frequently do not possess
political positions or experience, but instead depend entirely on tribal support
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and are seemingly more concerned with prestige than with pursuing a specific
national agenda. In the 1989 elections, voters could cast their first vote for
whichever candidate they were connected to, and use their remaining votes to
support candidates with a political affiliation. Consequentially, candidates with
clearly defined ideological or political stances, such as Islamists and Leftists,
fared relatively well in that contest.
Both the gerrymandering issue and the electoral law serve the main function
of decreasing the chances of ideologically or politically motivated candidates
from gaining seats in Parliament. The result of this, as is demonstrated by every
parliamentary election since 1993, is the existence of parliaments that are
dominated by candidates with local tribal support, as opposed to political groups.
These aspects of the Jordanian electoral system pose major barriers to
representative politics in Jordan.
Governmental Restrictions on the Press, Parties, and NGOs
Also of crucial importance to the Parliament's situation in Jordan is the fact
that the power of civil society is severely limited through various restrictions on
the press, political parties, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Of
these issues, perhaps the most important is the legal framework regarding the
press. Admittedly, during the beginning of King Abdallah's reign as king, the
area of press freedoms saw marginal improvement. King Abdallah has, for
example, frequently expressed his desire to increase transparency and reduce
press restrictions in the Kingdom, and has taken some measures to reach these
goals, such as the removal of several particularly restrictive aspects of the Press
and Publications Law as well as the "the passage of new legislation to allow
private broadcast media. (The Committee to Protect Journalists, Press Freedom
Online, 2000). Still, the Jordanian press remains not free, as the current laws
continue to place major restrictions on what can and what cannot be written
(International Herald Tribune, 2007). Journalists remain unable to freely write
about various controversial subjects, especially anything critical of government
officials or policies (Press Freedom Online. 2000).
A separate but related issue concerns the weakness of political parties and
legal restrictions regarding parties' abilities to form and connect with voters. Of
course, political parties in Jordan are currently in a better position than they were
before. Political parties were allowed to operate as long as they work through
"legitimate and peaceful means, adhering to the supremacy of the law, the
principle of political pluralism, and the preservation of national unity. The law
also stated that political parties must "renounce all forms of violence and
discrimination, and avoid utilizing the state for partisan purposes." Finally, any
group that desired to form a political party was required to have at least 150
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founding members. The rules for the formation of a political party were changed
several times. The latest 2015 law altered the ways in which political parties
could receive funding: parties were promised public funds if the founding
members consisted of 500 people, and if they were restricted from accepting
funds from unapproved sources. To receive funding, parties have also to be from
5 governorates and include women and youth as founders and in high positions.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the new law decreased the required
number of founding members to 150 if the party does not want to receive public
funding (UNDP POGAR, 2007; The Office of King Hussein I of Jordan, 2007).
The new law can be perceived as somewhat beneficial to the growth of
political parties because it requires increased involvement for women and allows
for public funding. Registration regulations were also eased and non-resident
Jordanians were allowed to join in founding a party. Also, parties could not be
dissolved without a court order.
Finally, NGOs are marginalized by governmental regulations. Indeed, the
rights of non-governmental organizations in Jordan are so restricted and
controlled by the government that it is hardly accurate to refer to them as "nongovernmental." The government interferes with NGOs' affairs in virtually every
dimension—from funding to agendas.
Furthermore, restrictions on NGOs have been increasing in recent years.
Limitations are placed on permissible sources of NGO funds, prohibiting NGOs
operating in Jordan from accepting donations from various domestic and foreign
sources if they do not receive prior government permission (Human Rights
Watch, 2007). In short, governmental restrictions and methods of controlling
non-governmental organizations leave Jordanian NGOs entirely void of relevant
political power. The National Center for Human Rights pointed to the
responsibility of political parties and non-governmental organizations in
developing democracy and push that process forward. They should stand in the
face of the government’s policies that delay reform and weaken parliamentary
performance further negatively affecting reform (National Center for Human
Rights. 2017, 59-61).
Greatest Challenges Facing Parliament
As the above pages have made clear, the Jordanian Parliament faces many
challenges that has hampered its development. The Chamber of Deputies is
politically weak due to the legal system that grants far more power to the
executive than to the elected Parliament; it is likewise not fully representative of
the political beliefs of the Jordanian people thanks to electoral laws which
discourage Jordanian voters from selecting candidates based on anything other
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than personal ties. On micro-level terms, the Parliament is also plagued by
logistical inadequacies. Furthermore, restrictive laws have ensured that Jordan
does not possess the strong civil society that is necessary in order for societies to
liberalize. At the moment, it does not appear likely that these legal barriers will
change fundamentally in the near future, due in part to events external to
Jordanian affairs which have persuaded the government to maintain its firm grip
on political power. Finally, the Jordanian people understandably have very little
faith in their country's one elected political body. The combination of all of these
problems makes progress highly unlikely in the near future. If one of the many
major obstacles were to be removed—if, for example, electoral laws were
altered to allow politicians running on non-local platforms to gain seats in
parliament—the process of political liberalization could begin again in earnest.
But as long as each of the major challenges is present, the political situation in
Jordan will remain slow and static.
Another major obstacle to Parliament’s development has been the lack of
transparency and continued manipulation of elections – the degree of integrity -,
which can be referred to as distorted Parliament development syndrome.
Governments not only designed pre-determined election laws results, but also
manipulated election results. This significantly hit the transparency of elections
hence parliaments, which inevitably performed in a way that was viewed by
voters as weak and ineffective. The 12th to the 16th Houses of Deputies were
said to have non-transparent elections (Jordan Social and Economic Council,
2013, 103).
The Cater Center issued a report in 2013 in which it asserted that the 2007
and 2010 elections were non-transparent and witnessed interferences (Cater
Center. 2013). The National Center for Human Rights said almost the same
about the lack of transparency in elections (National Center of Human Rights.
2013). This reality affected the behavior of voters making them vote on personal
elegance and benefit bases and not on a politics of merit bases (Lust-Okar, 2006,
456). It also affected the quality, performance, and political weight of Parliament
making deputies hostages to their own personal benefits rather than public
interests. The 18th House of Deputy Election witnessed improvement, but the
phenomena of political money (Black Money), in which votes were subject to
buying and selling, continued and the Independent Election Commission was
unable to terminate this challenge) National Center for Human Rights, 2017, 57).
The first issue, the Parliament's political weakness, has already been
discussed in great detail. Most political power in Jordan is not in the hands of the
Parliament, but rather in those of the executive. The imbalance between
governments and parliaments made the latter subject to the powers of the
executive and look as a follower of it. Parliament, due to the government’s
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policies, lost its ability to perform independently and stand in the face of
government. The second issue, the unrepresentative nature of the Parliament due
to current electoral laws, is also addressed above: candidates running on political
platforms concerning the entire nation are much less likely to win seats than are
candidates depending on local, often tribal, support. These issues represent two
of the most important challenges facing the Parliament today. At the moment, its
role in Jordanian politics is quite marginal, and this role will never increase if it
does not first become a body that truly represents the political agendas of
Jordanians on the national level, as opposed to a gathering of local elites lacking
a coherent agenda.
Events external to domestic Jordanian politics further worsen the already
grim prospects for the government moving forward with liberalization. The
peace process with Israel, the wars in the region and associated refugee problems
in Jordan, as well as rapidly increasing economic difficulties for the Jordanian
people all will remain on the top of the government's agenda; democratization
will most likely remain on the back-burner. Not only is political reform not a
priority, but democratization is often viewed by the government as a major threat
to the country given regional instability. Especially following the events of June
2007, when the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas violently took over Gaza, the
Jordanian government views any step that might give Islamists (i.e., the IAF)
more power or influence as a threat to the country's security (Schenker, 2006).
Another major challenge the Parliament faces is the absence of powerful
political parties in Jordan. Essentially the only relevant political party in Jordan
is the IAF, an Islamist party which by no means represents the entire spectrum of
Jordanian political opinions. The IAF is in many cases antithetical to the
interests of the state and those of Jordan's key allies, making it even less
satisfactory as the only organized national political party available to Jordanian
voters. Unfortunately, Jordanian society is not currently structured in a way that
encourages the growth of new political parties, for a number of reasons. The first
reason political parties are not forming in Jordan is the fact that the single
legitimate political outlet—the Parliament—is incredibly weak relative to the
state. Secondly, it is difficult for candidates running on national platforms to
gain seats, discouraging citizens from organizing into new political parties.
Thirdly, restricted press freedoms make it incredibly difficult for any potential
new political parties to express their messages to the voting public, or even, for
that matter, to adopt political messages that are largely opposed to the
government's policies. The final major barrier to the formation of new political
parties is the apathetic nature of Jordanian voters towards the Parliament in
general and political parties in specific. According to a recent report published
by Democracy Reporting International, public opinion polls show that only less
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than 10 percent of the Jordanian population felt that political parties "represented
their political, social, and economic aspirations," while 85 percent believed that
"none of the existing parties could effectively represent them (The Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, 2007). Given the lack of support for political parties in
Jordan, it is no surprise that citizens with political ambitions are not rushing to
form parties, opting instead for alternative methods of gaining support.
Unfortunately, the lack of enthusiasm for politics in Jordan is not limited to
partisan politics. The fact is that many Jordanians are apathetic regarding the
political process in Jordan. Whereas rural regions generally have good voter
turnout, turnouts in largely populated urban areas are usually much worse. In
Amman, it was often the case that only around 30% actually vote. Because rural
populations are traditionally viewed as more supportive of the state than are the
citizenry in urban areas, relatively weak voter turnout in urban areas means that
the parts of Jordan that most desire change do not see voting as a valuable
method of obtaining it. The lack of political energy in Jordan poses two major
challenges to the Parliament. Firstly, it obviously makes the Parliament less
representative. Secondly, the absence of a highly politicized polity allows the
stagnant nature of political life in Jordan—i.e. the lack of political parties, the
weakness of civil society, etc.—to continue indefinitely.
Another problem the Parliament faces, which has not yet been considered, is
the fact that it lacks the organizational and technological capacity)primitive
electronic voting systems and undeveloped sessions’ proceedings) necessary for
a political body to function on the level of parliaments in more developed
countries. The problems of this nature are essentially infrastructural issues such
as insufficient research capacities, poor training for both Members of Parliament
and parliamentary staff, and basic institutional inadequacies (USAID in Jordan,
2006). Of course, these problems pose barriers to Parliament functioning as
efficiently as possible. However, specific problems such as these are the kind
that can and should be addressed. Parliament needs continuous improvement in
these areas, though because such problems appear likely not to pose major longterm challenges to the Parliament, they would most accurately be categorized as
minor challenges in comparison to most other problems discussed in this section.
Undoubtedly, these issues overlap and fuel each other. As stated in the
introduction to this section, one of these challenges alone could most likely be
overcome by improvements in other areas. But as long as all the major
challenges—the limited legislative authority constitutionally granted to
Parliament, the problematic electoral system, the weakness of civil society and
government regulations causing it, and political apathy in the populace—exist, it
appears likely that the Parliament will remain, and least in the foreseeable future,
a weak political body possessing little public attention.
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Conclusion
This research is an attempt to investigate Jordan’s Parliamentary
development through which democracy can thrive. We found that the institution
which represents democracy in Jordan is weak and lacking the ability to perform
its main political duties, hence concluding that democracy in Jordan is in a place
of stagnation. Since its formation in 1929 until 2019, Parliament’s political
weight within the Jordanian political system and dynamics remains substantially
ineffective. The Executive Branch of government possess far more political
power than the Legislative Branch of government. This fact hits hardly the
credibility of the whole Jordanian political reform rhetoric. There seems to be no
real way to improve political reform, and a gradual process is the road decision
makers take when it comes to developing representative governmentship. Based
on this research, we offer the following specific conclusions and
recommendations:
1- This study revealed that parliamentary development is a strong indicator of
democratic status and development in Jordan. The lack of genuine
development of Parliament affected strongly the ability of significant
development in democracy in Jordan. The mutual effect between
democratization and parliamentary development could not be clearer than in
Jordan’s case.
2- House of Representative is not only weak, but also lacks public trust
according to continuous polls. This in part is due to the slow development
process and improvements, and the contradiction between public reform
rhetoric and the reality that lacks serious evidence of reform and
democratization. All constitutional Amendments, King Abdullah II
Discussion Papers (2012-2017), and dialogue committees, did not improve
the level of democracy and parliamentary performance to expectations.
Despite all of these measures taken, the institution that represents
democracy in Jordan – Parliament – is still weaker than the government and
ineffective in the decision making process.
3- Parliamentary development can at best be characterized as distorted.
External factors like the British mandate and the Palestinian issue, and
internal factors like election laws designed to favor the Executive Branch,
stand as major reasons and variables behind the distortion in parliamentary
development.
4- Election fraud and lack of transparency that polluted political parliamentary
life, in addition to Parliament’s institutional capacity are also reasons that
can explain Parliament’s inadequate improvement and role.
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5- This distortion produced weak Parliaments with little political role and
influence. Parliament became known as “service oriented” where MPs are
only interested in improving services to their small social constituencies,
and that came at the expense of Parliament’s national and political role.
6- Distorted parliamentary improvement and development negatively affected
the progress and credibility of the whole democratic development process in
Jordan. Jordan seems to be losing its regional age as a leading country when
it comes to reform and democratization.
7- While the constitutional amendments of 2011 were important in somewhat
restoring balance in the political system and dynamics giving Parliament
more power, the amendments of 2016 send a serious message about the
functions of parliamentary governments as it gives the unaccountable King
the sole right to make decisions rather than his accountable government
before Parliament.

 ﻣﺮاﺟﻌﺔ ﻧﻘﺪﻳﺔ:ﺗﻄﻮر اﳌﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﱪﳌﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻷردﻧﻴﺔ واﻷﺛﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻹﺻﻼح اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ
. اﻷردن، إرﺑﺪ، ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﻟﻴﺮﻣﻮك، ﻗﺴﻢ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ،ﻣﺤﻤﺪ اﻟﻤﻮﻣﻨﻲ وﺧﺎﻟﺪ اﻟﻌﺪوان
ﻣﻠﺨّﺺ
 ﻳﻬﺪف ﻫﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﻰ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﻢ دراﺳﺔ ﻧﻘﺪﻳﺔ ﻟﺘﻄﻮر اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎن اﻷردﻧﻲ وﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ ذﻟﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ:اﻟﻤﻠﺨﺺ
 اﻟﻔﺮﺿﻴﺔ اﻻﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺤﺚ ان ﻫﻨﺎك داﻟﺔ ﻗﻮﻳﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺗﻄﻮر اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ.اﻹﺻﻼح اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻷردن
 وﺗﻮﺻﻠﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ إﻟﻰ أن اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻤﺜﻞ.اﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻌﻴﺔ ودرﺟﺔ اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺔ ﺑﻼردن
 وأن،ﺟﻮﻫﺮ اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻷردن ﺿﻌﻴﻔﺔ وﺗﻔﺘﻘﺮ ﻟﻠﻘﺪرة ﻋﻠﻰ أداء اﻟﻮﺟﺒﺎت اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺴﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻃﺔ ﺑﻬﺎ
1929  وأﻧﻪ وﻣﻨﺬ اﻟﺘﺄﺳﻴﺲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺎم.اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻷردن وﻛﻨﺘﻴﺠﺔ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺮﻛﻮد
 وﺗﺘﻤﺘﻊ. ﻇﻠﺖ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎن ﻓﻲ إﻃﺎر اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ اﻷردﻧﻲ ﺑﺪون أﺛﺮ،2019 وﺣﺘﻰ
 ﻫﺬه اﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻮﺻﻞ اﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺤﺜﻨﺎ ﺗﺆﺛﺮ.اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﺑﺴﻠﻄﺔ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ أﻛﺒﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻌﻴﺔ
 ﺗﻢ اﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻟﻤﻨﻬﺞ اﻟﻮﺻﻔﻲ اﻟﺘﺤﻠﻴﻠﻲ.ﺳﻠﺒﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻄﺎب اﻹﺻﻼح اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ اﻷردﻧﻲ ﺑﺄﻛﻤﻠﻪ
.واﻟﺘﺎرﻳﺨﻲ وﻣﻨﻬﺞ ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﻀﻤﻮن ﻣﻦ اﺟﻞ اﺛﺒﺎت ﺻﺤﺔ اﻟﻔﺮﺿﻴﺔ اﻻﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺤﺚ
. اﻹﺻﻼح اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻲ واﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮري، اﻹﺻﻼح اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ، ﺗﻄﻮر اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎن:اﻟﻜﻠﻤﺎت اﻟﻤﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ
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